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Abstract 
The relationship between attention and academic performance has been of interest starting with 
early studies on academic success and failure. In this study we examine how attention measured in 
simple and prolonged over-learned response tasks correlates with and contributes to scientific 
reasoning and school achievement (GPA). To study attention, the Attention Concentration Test 
(ACT) was used and to study scientific reasoning, a modified version of Science Reasoning Tasks, 
tapping control-of-variable schemata, was used. Of special interest was the highest performing 
attention group (+ 1 SD) formed from the ACT results. We gathered our data from Finnish ninth 
graders (n = 358; including 166 girls) from the city located in the eastern part of Finland. Statisti-
cally analysed results showed that attention contributed to scientific reasoning, which in turn ex-
plained the largest share of the GPA variance. The highest attention group differed from the lowest 
two attention groups in GPA and from all attention groups in scientific reasoning. For educational 
practitioners the ACT seems to be a useful tool in assessing exceptional academic learning potential 
in students. 
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Cognitive abilities invite a convergence of pedagogical and developmental research 
(Adey, Csapó,  Demetriou, Hautamäki & Shayer, 2007; Gottfredson, 2002; Demetriou, 
Spanoudis & Mouyi, 2011; Jensen, 1998; Nisbett, Aronson, Blair, Dickens,  Flynn, 
Halpern & Turkheimer, 2012). In such studies the predicted factors have generally been 
school achievement, matriculation into selective institutions of higher education, or work 
related outcomes. On one hand, abilities are used to predict relevant outcomes using one 
index – intelligence, g-factor, fluid intelligence (gF), or reasoning – or several measures 
of some of the plenty lower-strata broad and specialized cognitive factors (Carroll, 
1993). On the other hand, cognitive abilities have occupied the position of the dependent 
variable to be understood or explained (Jung & Haier, 2008).  In the latter case, the ex-
planatory variables have been, for example, genetic and neural mechanisms (Garlick, 
2002; Geary, 2005), attention (Cowan, 2000) and working memory (Blair, 2006). Specif-
ically, there are thousands of studies to be found, for each of the presented notions in 
their various forms. However, there are only few comprehensive models intended to 
make an integration of concepts dealing with neural and brain connections with mediat-
ing factors like attention and working memory or with concepts dealing with educational 
outcomes (Gustafsson, 2002; Demetriou et al., 2011).  
A useful hypothesis is given by Gray, Chabris & Braver (2003, p. 316). They make 
explicit the connection between fluid intelligence and attentional control. Heitz, Un-
sworth and Engle (2004) are on the same line – in relation to Raven – by asking how 
much of gF can be attributed for the attention. 
Given all the above, the study of this integration is important (Adey et al., 2007) and we 
intend to support this endeavor with specifications of the relations of three domains: 
attention, reasoning and achievement. Reasoning is studied as an independent factor in 
relation to school achievement as a mediating factor. In that model, it is possible to pro-
pose also the time-order of processes, from attention to reasoning and finally to school 
marks. In real human development, time-order is wrapped in feedback loops to the extent 
that it is possible to claim that schooling or cultural institutions cultivate higher mental 
functions (Adey et al., 2007; Bruner, 1986; Ceci, 1991; Cole, 1996; Luria, 1976; Olson, 
2003; Vygotski, 1978). 
Attention 
In the study, attention is understood as a fundamental attentional capacity (Smit & van 
der Ven, 1995). Contained within this definition are assumptions such as that the ability 
to reason and the ability to perform well at school are dependent on the ability to concen-
trate (attention), and that attention is present in all cognitive tasks requiring mental effort.  
Attention is considered to be crucial for learning and it is also claimed to be a central 
factor of intelligence (Baillargeon, Pascual-Leone & Roncadin, 1998; Spearman, 1927; 
van der Ven, 2001). Still, there is no general agreement how attention should be defined 
and measured. Logan (2004), for example, emphasizes that paradigmatic consistency and 
task shifting in attention research has produced substantial cumulative progress in our 
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Main approaches using reaction times can be roughly divided into two different test 
traditions: a) speed tests and b) concentration tests (Smit & van der Ven, 1995). Speed 
tests contain tasks with varying difficulty that can be solved if enough time is given. In 
the case of concentration tests similar but relatively easy test items have been used, but 
registration of the reaction times has been different, for example, a subject’s time per test 
item and subject’s time of the groupings of test items have been used (Jensen, 1982; Smit 
& van der Ven, 1995). When trying to capture pure measure of subject’s attention the 
earlier form of testing and related results are easily distracted by the lack of knowledge, 
the lack of experience and inappropriate mental sets, which indeed, produce qualitative 
properties of mental ability instead of the needed quantitative one (van der Ven, 2001). 
This can be avoided when easy and overlearned response tasks are used. 
The Inhibition Theory (IT) of Ad van der Ven (2001; van der Ven, Smit & Jansen, 1989) 
is a useful theoretical model to explain how reaction times fluctuate in prolonged over-
learned response tasks, and how this is related to cognitive performance such as intelli-
gence (van der Ven, Gremmen & Smit, 2005). The IT is based on the basic assumption 
that during the performance of any mental task requiring a minimum of mental effort, the 
subject actually goes through a series of alternating latent states of distraction (non-work 
0) and attention (work 1) which cannot be observed and are completely imperceptible to 
the subject (Smit & van der Ven, 1995). In easy prolonged over-learned response based 
tasks a subject takes control of his or her progress through given test items and when 
accordingly measured produces indicator of his or her mental ability (Larson, & Alder-
ton, 1990; Klauer, 1993; Smit & van der Ven, 1995; Spearman, 1927; Steinborn, Flehm-
ig, Westhoff, & Langer, 2008). The Attention Concentration Test used in this study is 
based on IT theory (van der Ven, 2013). 
Finally, it is important to underscore that inhibition theory and related models transcend 
recent cognitive psychological approaches which describe attention as a cognitive func-
tion often categorized for several sub-abilities such as focused, sustained, selective, 
alternating and divided attention (e.g., Logan, 2004) and also both from the cognitive 
inhibition (e.g., Houdé, 2000) and the ADHD approaches in which, for example, behav-
ioral inhibition is closely linked to sustained attention and executive functions (e.g., 
Baddeley, 1986).  
School achievement 
School achievement is affected by many variables, such as subjects’ characteristics, both 
cognitive and non-cognitive (personality traits, self-perceptions etc.), classroom practices 
(teacher-student interaction), and contextual variables (home and community contexts).  
According to the latest studies (Lu, Weber, Spinath & Shi, 2011), the strongest effect is 
attributed to the cognitive abilities (Gottfredson, 2002; Freudenthaler, Spinath, & 
Neubauer, 2008) even though contradictory findings have been reported, as well (cf. 
Spinath, Spinath, Harlaar & Plomin, 2006). Close to our study, Steinborn et al. (2008) 
reported how self-paced performance, in particular response speed variability, contrib-
utes to school achievement. Their study provided support that reaction time coefficient of 
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predictor of the school achievement, especially, mathematics performance. In Finland, as 
in other western countries, female students usually perform better when school grades 
are used as an indicator of school achievement (Hautamäki, Kupiainen, Marjanen, 
Vainikainen & Hotulainen, 2013). Gender differences emerge especially in language 
related subjects for the girls and in math-related subjects for the boys, and corresponding 
self-reported ability perceptions show greater difference than the actual performance 
level does. The recent PISA results show that math performance is actually higher 
among girls in Finland as well (Hautamäki et al. 2008; Kupari, Välijärvi, Andersson, 
Arffman, Nissinen, Puhakka &Vettenranta, 2013). In this study we restrict our interest 
for the two cognitive components that contribute to school achievement, namely scien-
tific reasoning and attention.   
Scientific reasoning 
Developmental psychologists have long studied scientific reasoning. One of the most 
studied constructs in this tradition is the control of variables strategy, which was first 
introduced by Inhelder and Piaget (1958) as part of the formal operational thinking con-
struct (see Shayer, 1979). Later researchers (see Neimark, 1975; Kuhn, 2002; Shayer, 
2008) showed that the control of variables strategy is central to science and an essential 
skill that is attainable and trainable by the time and well-structured interventions when 
children are cognitively advancing toward a formal operational level (Adey et al., 2007; 
Kuhn, 2008; Shayer, 2008). 
In this study, scientific reasoning was conceptualized as formal operational thinking, and 
more specifically on control-of-variable schemata (Scientific reasoning).  Regardless of 
the recent partly controversial developmental views on scientific reasoning and its corre-
spondence to the Piagetian thinking stages (Kuhn 2002; Kuhn, Iordanou, Pease & Wirka-
la, 2008), in Finland experimental studies have shown that assessment of scientific rea-
soning shares properties that correspond to the earlier findings concerning formal opera-
tion percentage shares within target population (Hautamäki, 1989; Kuusela, 2002). For 
this reason formal operations were considered to be a valid choice for a study variable. 
Moreover, the Piaget’s thinking stages have shown to correspond with findings of mod-
ern neuroscience, as brain scan methods have produced results of neural maturation that 
parallel the stages (Emick & Welsh, 2005; Shute & Huertas, 1990).  
The emergence of formal operations at around 12-15 years of age involves reasoning 
based on hypotheses, independent of concrete objects. The age variation is considered to 
be rooted in different intellectual stimuli in children’s environments and to be dependent 
on personal interest and quality and amount of experiences. On the other words,   formal 
thinking is not necessarily applied all the time or across all domains. (Piaget, 1972; 
2006).  Following Inhelder and Piaget (1958), Shayer and Wylam (1978) reported a 
survey of 10,000 10- to 16 year-olds, showing that in a class of 12 year-olds (Adey et al., 
2007) mental ages ranged from that of average 6 year-old to an above-average 18 year-
old. Hautamäki (1989; 2000) in a replication of the Shayer and Wylam (1978) survey 
reported identical results in Finland, finding that less than one third of 15-year-olds Measured attention, scientific reasoning and school achievement  241
reached at least the earliest formal operational level and only five percent have reached 
solid level in their thinking as in England.  
Here we use scientific reasoning as an indicator of scientific thinking when studying 
parallel effects. Regardless of the recent controversial findings concerning how control 
of variable strategy develops and how it can be supported in school setting (Kuhn, 2002; 
Kuhn, Iordanou, Pease & Wirkala, 2008) one of the goals of this study is to produce 
additional information concerning prerequisites of the high level scientific thinking. 
Purpose of the study 
With this study we aim to fill one of the gaps in the literature on the scientific reasoning 
and school achievement of high able students, that is, the impact of their attentional 
capacity measured by prolonged over-learned response tasks, on their academic perfor-
mance. As student’s gender is strongly shown to be bound to the school achievement, the 
effect of gender is studied in the line of study hypotheses.  
The following hypotheses resulted from the literature review and our study interest: 
–  Hypothesis 1: Measured attention in prolonged over-learned response task predicts 
school achievement. Attention also explains performance in scientific reasoning 
tasks, and the effect of attention on school achievement is partially mediated by per-
formance in scientific reasoning tasks. 
–  Hypothesis 2: Highly able students identified with the measured attention in pro-
longed overlearned response tasks have both higher scientific reasoning skills and 
higher school achievement than students who do not show such high attentional ca-
pacity. 
 
When classifying some students to belong among highly able we involuntary form other 
groups having not that high but lower attention ability. For this reason we are simultane-
ously interested in studying if the lowest performing group differs from the groups hav-
ing higher attention. This is of interest to gain approximation of the ecological validity of 
the ACT as an attention screening measure. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of an entire age cohort of ninth graders attending regular nine-
grade comprehensive education in a small town situated in the east of Finland, N = 358, 
52% male, average age of 16 years (220 months, SD = 4 months). All participating 
schools represent a mixed-ability system having neither entry nor selection criteria. 
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Instruments 
The Formal Operations Test. 
This test measures scientific reasoning. Content-wise, the test measures the mastery of 
control of variables, scientific reasoning schemata. The test is a second-generation modi-
fied group-version (Hautamäki, 1989, 2000) of the original Scientific Reasoning Tasks, 
the Pendulum (Shayer, 1979; Shayer & Wylam, 1978). Formula 1 has been widely used 
in Finnish studies and the used format (race cars) has shown no gender differences (Hau-
tamäki et al., 2013). In Formula 1, the subjects compared F1 drivers, cars, tires, and race 
tracks (four variables, all with two given values from which to select: Räikkönen, Schu-
macher; Ferrari, McLaren; Michelin, Bridgestone; Monaco, Silverstone). Subjects were 
given a set of values for the four variables (such as Räikkönen, Ferrari, Michelin, Mona-
co) and asked to construct another set that would clarify the role of a specified variable, 
for example, tires. Subjects were asked to produce a set of values for all four variables so 
that the focal variable was studied with an unconfounded pair (see Strand-Cary & Klahr, 
2008). In half of the items, the subjects were given a dual set (Räikkönen, McLaren, 
Michelin, Monaco vs. Räikkönen, Ferrari, Michelin, Monaco) and asked if this was a 
good test of, to continue the example, the role of tires (in this case, the question was 
confounded for tires, unconfounded for the nonfocal variable car). Subjects chose their 
selection from a given set of values for all variables, or answered by checking whether 
the pair is a good test of driver, car, tires, race (yes, I do not know; no, I do not know 
always coded for 0). The nine items were coded dichotomously and summarized into the 
Scientific Reasoning test score. The reliability of the test was .84. Half the class took the 
paper-and-pencil formal operation test while the other half performed attention tasks in 
the computer lab. The groups switched after 30 min. The subjects were encouraged to do 
their best and to spend the time needed to find solutions on both tests. Neither the time of 
day nor the order of the tests affected the results. 
School achievement.  
The Grade point average (GPA) was computed as the mean of nine school subjects, 
obtained from the school register and common to all study participants. A GPA value of 
4 is a failing grade, while 10 is the best grade for any subject, corresponding to A+ in the 
United States. The reliability of GPA was .86. 
The Attention Concentration Test (ACT).  
The ACT primarily measures attention or more specifically the level of concentration as 
measured by variation of series of reaction times.  The test is based on the following 
three assumptions: 1) knowledge should not play a part in the final test score; only sim-
ple problems should be used; 2) differences in previous experience with the task should 
not be allowed, and 3) temporal feelings should not play a part; multiple tries should not 
be allowed to make the best results.  
The ACT has the following options:  
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Difficulty: Easy (one target), Medium (two targets), Difficult (three targets) 
Task: Colors, Positions, Dice 
Instruction: Quickly vs. Relax 
Stimulus-number: Fixed vs. Random 
 
The first one of each category is the default options. The students performed the test with 
as Task: Positions, with as Stimulus-number: Random, restricted and with the default 
version of the test for all other categories. Each bar consisted of the following types of 
dice:  
two eyes horizontal in the middle, 
two eyes vertical in the middle, 
two eyes horizontal upwards, 
two eyes horizontal downwards, 
two eyes vertical to the right, 
two eyes vertical to the left. 
 
The student had to click on the dice, in which the eyes are horizontal in the middle (the 
target dice).  Figure 1 shows an example of a particular bar.  
The dice were displayed in random order. Each bar consisted of 18 dice. For each button 
of a bar one of the above types of dice was randomly chosen with probability 1/6 and 
taken as that particular button. If in the resulting bar two consecutive dice were the same 
or, if the target dice did not occur at least once, then a new bar was created with a new 
arrangement of dice. This was repeated until no two consecutive dice were the same and 
the target dice occurred at least one time. Underneath each bar a separate “Next” button 
was displayed. The instruction read as follows: “Click on the dice, in which the eyes are 
horizontal in the middle. Work as quickly as possible, making no errors. Click on the 
dice in the order they are given in the dice bar starting from left to right. In order to go to 
the next dice bar you must click on the Next button, which is located underneath the 
dice.” If errors were made, the test was failed and the student had to start all over again. 
The actual test consisted of a series of 25 observed consecutive reaction times. For the 
actual analysis not the original reaction times were used but reaction times which were 
corrected for possible test effects. The method of correction was as follows: Firstly, for  
 
 
 
Figure 1: 
Task bar and instruction “Click on the dice, in which the eyes are horizontal in the middle” R. Hotulainen, H. Thuneberg, J. Hautamäki & M.-P. Vainikainen   244
each reaction time series, a multiple regression analysis was performed with the number 
of buttons to be pressed and the serial number of the last button as independent variables 
and the reaction time as the dependent variable (N = 25). Next, the original reaction 
times were corrected by taking the residuals of the multiple regression added by the 
observed mean of the original reaction times. The analyses to be reported below are all 
based on these corrected reaction times. When using the ACT as a screening tool for 
potential attention concentration deficits and potential high achievers among ninth grad-
ers, values both above 1 standard deviations from the mean and below -1 standard devia-
tions from the mean respectively, are used as an identification limit (A. G. H. S. van der 
Ven, personal communication, July 20, 2009). When a student fails to pass the test he or 
she is classified to the below 1 standard deviation group. We used four tier categorization  
(below -1 SD, between mean and -1 SD, between mean and + 1 SD, above + 1 SD,) to 
study if those students belonging to either high attention or low attention groups differed 
from each other and from attention groups falling between on scientific reasoning and 
school achievement.  
Analysis procedures 
Descriptive statistics were calculated with SPSS21. Path modelling was applied in 
AMOS21, using the default method of missing data handling (raw maximum likelihood 
missing data handling) (Byrne, 2010). The goodness of overall fit of the estimated mod-
els was evaluated by four indicators: χ
2 -test, CFI, TLI, RMSEA. The models were con-
sidered having a good fit with CFI and TLI > .95, and RMSEA < .06, and an acceptable 
fit with CFI and TLI > .90, and RMSEA < .08 Group comparisons in path analyses were 
conducted by fitting the models simultaneously on groups based on the ACT scores, 
constraining stepwise path coefficients and means equal across groups, and studying the 
relative changes in the fit indices (see Byrne & Stewart, 2009). 
Results 
First, we introduce descriptive statistics of the study by gender (Table 1). It is notewor-
thy that attention scores gained by the ACT results must be read in the opposite direction 
meaning the lower the value, the smaller the deviation and the better the attention. 
The first hypothesis stated that attention would predict school achievement and explain 
performance in scientific reasoning tasks so that the effect of attention on school 
achievement would be partially mediated by scientific reasoning skills. To test this, two 
path models were specified. In the first stage of modeling it was first tested whether 
attention predicted GPA directly. Then scientific reasoning was added to the model as a 
mediator, and indirect effects were studied to determine whether the mediation hypothe-
sis held (cf., Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). The effect of the gender on school achieve-
ment was controlled by adding gender in the model as a covariate. Only the students who 
passed the ACT test were used in this model (n = 301).  
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Table 1: 
The descriptives of the study  
Measure  n  Items  Min  Max  Mean  SD 
Scientific reasoning 
Boys  187  9  0  9  3.71  2.66 
Girls  162  9  0  9  3.86  2.51 
Total  349  9  0  9  3.78  2.59 
GPA 
Boys  192  11  5.18  9.91  7.69  1.06 
Girls  166  11  5.73  9.82  8.06  .94 
Total  358  11  5.18  9.91  7.86  1.02 
Attention* 
Boys  157    -1.13  1.18  -.29  .39 
Girls  145    -1.31  .98  -.25  .44 
Total  302    -1.31  1.18  -.27  .42 
Note: *Fifty-six subjects failed the ACT test and constituted a low attention group and due to relative 
large size of this group we named them as below -1 SD group. 
 
 
The first stage of modeling revealed that attention and gender were not related but as 
expected, attention predicted GPA (β = -.15, p < .01). When scientific reasoning was 
added to the model, the direct effect of attention on GPA decreased to β = -.07 (ns.), 
which can be interpreted as a sign of mediation.  Gender did not predict scientific reason-
ing. The final model without the non-significant paths is presented in Figure 2. 
When focusing on scientific reasoning and its predictive properties it was found that the 
effect of scientific reasoning (β = .44, p < .001) on GPA, explained 19 % of the variance 
of GPA. Furthermore, gender (β = -.18, p < .001) explained 3 % of the GPA variance. 
Attention (β = -.19, p < .001) explained 3 % of the variance of scientific reasoning. Alto-
gether 22 % of the variance of GPA could be explained with this model which fit the 
data excellently (χ2 = 0.88, df = 2, p = 0.64, CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.019, RMSEA = .000).  
 
 
Figure 2: 
Model of predicting school achievement 
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In Model 2, which is depicted in Figure 3, attention scores were divided into four groups: 
those who failed (n = 56) formed below -1 SD group, between -1 SD and mean (n = 
117), between mean and + 1 SD (n = 121), above +1 SD (n = 48) to study effect of such 
grouping.  When the effect of gender on GPA was controlled for, GPA was directly 
predicted by attention grouping and scientific reasoning, and indirectly by attention 
grouping via scientific reasoning. The direct effect of attention grouping on scientific 
reasoning (β = .24, p< .001) explained 6 % of the scientific reasoning variance. The total 
effect of attention grouping on GPA (β = .26) explained 7 % of the GPA variance.  
When focusing on scientific reasoning and its predictive properties it was found that the 
effect of scientific reasoning (β = .38, p < .001) on GPA explained 14 % of the GPA 
variance. Moreover, gender (β = -.17, p < .001) explained 3 % of the GPA variance. The 
total model explained 23 % of the GPA variance. The model fit the data well (χ2 = 0.47, 
df = 2, p = 0.790, CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.072, RMSEA = .000).   
To study second hypothesis “Students identified to have high attention have higher sci-
entific reasoning and school achievement than the students who did not show such high 
attention”, another path model was specified without having attention as a predictor. 
Instead, the earlier introduced grouping based on the ACT measure was used as a group-
ing variable.  The groups were compared by fitting the model to all groups simultaneous-
ly and constraining stepwise the paths and means equal across groups. The constrained 
models showing relevant results are presented in the following Table 2. Changes of the 
fit indices (CFI and TLI) were used to determine if the constrained models are different 
from the baseline model (see Table 2). Constraints were added in the following way: in 
the first model, path coefficients were set equal across groups, followed by the model in 
which path coefficients and gender (relative proportions of genders) were equal across 
groups. These models fitted the data well and as the indices changed only minimally, it 
was concluded that there were no group differences regarding the paths and gender. The 
next model in where paths and all means were set equal across groups showed an ex-
tremely poor fit. This indicated that there were statistically significant differences be-
tween groups in either GPA, scientific reasoning or both. These differences were ana- 
 
 
 
Figure 3: 
Model two of predicting school achievement  
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lyzed in more detail by first constraining the means of the two variables equal across 
groups one at a time while the other variable was allowed to vary free. As this showed 
that there were statistically significant group differences in both variables, the groups 
were then compared by constraining the group means equal pairwise, one variable at a 
time.  
 
 
Table 2: 
Model comparison of the latent variables and changes in fit indices in group comparisons 
Model  χ²Δ  dfΔ CFI TLI RMSEA pΔ 
GPA and Scientific reasoning by attention groups 
Baseline model (χ² results are reported instead 
of the χ²Δ differences)   .551 4 1.000 1.445 .000  .968 
Path coefficients constrained equal across 
groups 4.800 6  1.000 1.240 .000  .570 
Paths coefficients and gender (relative 
proportions of the two genders) constrained 
equal across groups  3.612 3 1.000 1.160 .000  .306 
Path coefficients, gender and all means 
constrained equal across groups 32.595 6  .515 .387 .058  <.001 
Group comparisons 
GPA (scientific reasoning varies free across groups) 
High able and above mean group are equal 3.752 1  1.000 1.047 .000 .053 
High able and below mean group are equal   7.910 1  .938 .894 .024  .005 
High able and low performing are equal 10.149 1  .890 .812 .032  .001 
Low performing and below mean are equal 1.296 1  1.000 1.138 .000 .255 
Low performing and above mean are equal 4.118 1  1.000 1.034 .000 .042 
Below and above mean are equal  1.595 1  1.000 1.127 .000  .207 
Scientific reasoning (GPA varies free across groups) 
High able and above mean group are equal 5.527 1  .963 .982 .010 .019 
High able and below mean group are equal   11.002 1  .872 .780 .032  .001 
High able and low performing group are equal  18.528 1  .710 .503 .052  <.000 
Low performing and below mean are equal 3.234 1  1.000 1.066 .000 .072 
Low performing and above mean are equal 8.488 1  .926 .873 .026 .004 
Below and above mean are equal  1.957 1  1.000 1.114 .000  .162 
Note: CFI= Comparative fit index, TLI=Tucker-Lewis index, RMSEA=Root mean square error of 
approximation 
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Table 3: 
Descriptives of the Scientific reasoning and GPA by attention grouping based on ACT-results 
Measure  Grouping  n  M  SD  Min  Max 
Scientific 
reasoning 
not passed (low attention)  56  2.77  2.60  0  8 
below average  117  3.57  2.61  0  8 
above average  121  3.99  2.45  0  9 
highest (high attention)  48  4.98  2.42  0  9 
Total  342  3.79  2.60  0  9 
GPA  not passed (low attention)  56  7.41  1.01  5.18  8.91 
below average  123  7.75  1.00  5.64  9.82 
above average  124  7.95  .98  5.36  9.82 
highest (high attention)  48  8.37  .91  5.64  9.73 
Total  351  7.85  1.02  5.18  9.82 
 
 
Group comparisons regarding the both studied variables showed approximately parallel 
model fit decrease when the comparison advanced towards low performing group. Table 
2 shows that there were statistically significant differences between high attention and all 
the other groups in scientific reasoning. Differences were parallel in school achievement 
with the exception between high attention group and above mean attention group (see 
also descriptives in Table 3). 
Discussion 
In this study we examined how attention measured in prolonged over-learned response 
tasks predicts scientific reasoning and school performance and if high levels of attention 
have a significant relationship with high level scientific reasoning and school perfor-
mance. This was done by fitting path models on the data from 358 Finnish ninth graders. 
In the models, school achievement was predicted by performance in the Attention Con-
centration Test and scientific reasoning test, controlling the effect of gender on GPA. 
Modelling showed that the most powerful single predictor of school performance was 
scientific reasoning. In general, in the comprehensive model, attention added little to the 
predictive validity indicated by scientific reasoning. The effect of attention was mainly 
indirect, scientific reasoning being the mediator. However, results showed that students 
who belonged to the high attention group possessed higher scientific reasoning scores 
and school grades (GPA) when compared to their counterparts possessing lower attention 
level. In other words, exceptional high level attention measured in simple prolonged 
working task seems to facilitate attainment of high-level scientific reasoning and school 
achievement.  
Differences emerged between students’ performance and students’ attention level. First, 
the results showed that students who did not pass the test possessed lower scientific Measured attention, scientific reasoning and school achievement  249
reasoning and lower school grades. These findings can be interpreted in three ways: (a) 
students who fail the attention test have fundamental deficiencies in their scientific rea-
soning and learning; (b) students who failed the test may not have adjusted toward tasks 
measuring their school related behaviour, including scientific reasoning and computer 
tasks, and (c) students who failed the test require more time to learn and over-learn pre-
conditions of the ACT – which correlates their success in scientific reasoning tasks and 
school performance. Nevertheless, in addition, these study findings show that unsuccess-
ful ACT performance is associated with lower level scientific reasoning and school per-
formance. This finding in turn has both theoretical and practical implications; when do 
these differences in attention, scientific reasoning and school achievement emerge and 
how do they develop? How attention measured by prolonged over-learned response tasks 
is associated with the working memory measures that have often stated to be in the cen-
tral role in the cognitive performance (cf. Bühner, Mangels, Krumm & Ziegler, 2005).  If 
there are differences in children’s attention before school-age how does this affect their 
learning in informal and formal learning situations?   
Secondly, two additional conclusions can be drawn from the results, at least in general 
terms. First, mediation analysis revealed that attention did not have a direct effect on 
school performance itself but via scientific reasoning. Second, when the ACT results 
were used as a screening measure to identify either low or high level attention, as van der 
Ven (personal communication, July 20, 2009) have recommended, the formed four-tier 
categorization showed clear between groups differences for both the high and low atten-
tion groups both in scientific reasoning and school achievement.   
To deepen the discussion, our results for the relationship of formal operation to achieve-
ment align well with previous results from intelligence test scores, that indicate 25 % of 
variation in achievement is explained by intelligence (Steinmayr & Spinath, 2008), and 
even more with Freudenthaler et al.’s (2008) results, demonstrating 23 % of the 
achievement variance was due to the intelligence factor. However, in this study we con-
clude that the 19 % of explained variance in GPA is accorded to scientific reasoning. 
Indeed, high level attention measured in prolonged over learned response tasks seems to 
facilitate acquisition of the higher level scientific reasoning which in turn is associated 
with school performance. Our study does not clearly show the extent to which high level 
attention is required for the highest level of scientific reasoning but it certainly facilitates 
learning the most challenging tasks.   
This study has numerous practical implications. It is obvious that by this method one can 
identify low-performing students. The test parameters can be adjusted for the age-level 
suitable for the kindergarten-aged children onwards. Additionally, due to the fact that the 
ACT assesses attention in a consistent way, it could be used as an additional method 
along with the more traditional and often interpretive ways (e.g. check-lists, ICD 10) to 
reliably identify attention capacity and its disorders (e.g. ADD and ADHD). The ACT 
could help to make the important distinction whether ADHD has a neurological origin, 
or whether observed secondary attention and behavioral difficulties are products of poor 
environmental-fit. Thus, by using ACT as a screening method we might likely find those 
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on the other hand, those, whose attention difficulties are products of deficits in their 
environment, and could be supported simply by altering prevailing conditions.  
We also can suggest that the ACT be used in intervention and training purposes. Though 
it seems obvious, those who have high scores in ACT possess the ability to perform 
academically at the higher level. Thus, the ACT provides a method to identify both po-
tential high achievers and underachievers. Results of the ACT test could provide added 
value in educational counseling situations, especially when assigning high-performing 
students to academic tracks.  In future studies it would be important to determine if peo-
ple with the highest attention levels  achieve on the highest levels in other ways, for 
example in extracurricular activities such as music, sport and arts.    
In summary, this study revealed that simple prolonged working tasks provide predictive 
values of both scientific reasoning and school achievement. This finding is based on 
evidence that when measuring cognitive performance and its components very simple 
attentional tasks should be used to measure characteristics that are idiosyncratic to the 
learner and to his or her cumulative learning (cf. Gustafsson & Carlstedt, 2006; Heitz, 
Unsworth & Engle, 2004; Smit van der Ven, 1995).  Individual differences in simple 
attentional tasks seem to provide promising additional value when building comprehen-
sive models explaining cognitive performance such as intelligence. When knowing that 
environment and motivational factors strongly effect learning and development of exper-
tise we do not argue that attention measured by the tools, such as the ACT, explain the 
greatest proportion of those achievements, but we assume that differences in attention 
may orient towards best fit between individual and environment and only exceptional 
deficiencies in attention can create overwhelming barriers for learning (Stoeger, 2013; 
Ziegler & Phillipson, 2013). However, to study how applicable this model is outside of 
the academic field calls for further research (see also Ziegler, Heckel & Ziegler, 2013). 
To sum up, this study suggests how we may identify academic low and high achievers at 
the end of Finnish comprehensive school by wise use of the ACT.  Despite concerns 
regarding the comprehensive nature of the Finnish school system the success level in the 
ACT produced statistically significant differences in relation to the examined study 
variables, scientific reasoning and school achievement. Consequently, according to these 
studied variables, the potential academic giftedness and potential academic low-
achievers could be identified in the future with the help of the ACT.  It is noteworthy that 
with a poor ACT test result it is nearly impossible to be a high achiever in both in scien-
tific reasoning and school achievement. Simultaneously, many students end up as low 
achievers in measured outcome variables regardless of their good or even excellent level 
of attention. According to the latest PISA findings (Kupari et al., 2013) and according to 
findings that report a negative Flynn effect in developed western countries (Australia, 
Finland, Great-Britain, New Zealand, USA, etc.) including Finland, students’ cognitive 
levels in such measures are declining when comparing performance of earlier age co-
horts at all achievement levels (Dutton & Lynn, 2013). As Kuhn (2007) reminds us, in 
today’s school the most challenging task is to make school sensible to the young people 
for whom they are designed, including the high achievers. Measured attention, scientific reasoning and school achievement  251
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